Abstract-Given the current situation on the Internet, it is important to determine the trust of the communication routes between a client and server. Such determination can only be established by end terminals such as clients and servers, not by intermediate routers or network providers so far. The revelations regarding PRISM and other programs highlight the importance of this issue. In this paper, a method to identify the trust level of a route between a client and a server is proposed. This method identifies the trust level using packet authentication, Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM), and knowledge bases maintained by trusted third parties. A prototype system of the proposed method was developed and evaluated, and the evaluation results prove its feasibility. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed method is the first method to identify the trust level of a route based on information obtained from intermediate routers or Autonomous Systems (ASs).
I. INTRODUCTION
Data communication services are increasingly used with PCs and smartphones, increasing Internet usage worldwide. Problems with information security when using the Internet are also increasing, and solutions for such problems are urgently needed.
Current end-to-end communication on the Internet when using a service can cross many regions and countries, however, it is not known which regions and countries are being crossed during a particular session. This issue is not limited to regions and countries; it is also unknown which networks or routers are being used during a session.
In 2013, PRISM, the surveillance program of the US National Security Agency (NSA), became widely known because of disclosures by the Guardian and Washington Post [1] , [2] . Although the implicated providers and companies denied joining the program, the news reported otherwise. Furthermore, other similar incidents have occurred. In December 2013, the NSA asked for the RSA's pseudo-random number generator to have a backdoor by default [3] . Additionally, in May 2014, it was revealed that the NSA put a backdoor for surveillance on routers and servers exported overseas [4] .
Encryption and mutual authentication for end-to-end communication on the Internet are currently widely used. Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) on HTTP is the most common technology for encryption and mutual authentication. Given the current situation, we also should determine the communication routes between clients and servers. In addition, such determination can only be established by end terminals such as clients and servers, not by intermediate routers or network providers.
To determine the route between a client and a server, traceroute is a widely known method. Its computational load and inability to obtain return journey information are the main drawbacks of traceroute. Reverse traceroute obtains return journey information, but the performance remains inefficient. Secure traceroute was proposed for avoiding manin-the-middle attacks by intermediate routers. This method uses cryptographic techniques to identify packets between routers and hide data from third parties. Although not currently known, its performance could be a drawback. To the best of our knowledge, a method is not known that identifies route trust level based on information obtained from intermediate routers or ASs.
In this paper, a method to determine the trust level of the route between a client and a server is proposed. This proposed method includes packet authentication between routers and obtains route information between a client and server using Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM), an IP traceback technique.
A prototype of the proposed method was developed using modified Linux routers and specific communication between client and server. The performance of the proposed method was then evaluated. The results show that the method does not heavily load the routers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, related works including PPMs and traceroutes are described. Requirements for identifying the trust level of a route are specified in Section 3. Our proposed method is presented in Section 4, and its implementation and performance evaluation is discussed in Section 5. In Section 6, limitations of the proposal and future work are described. The paper is concluded in Section 8.
II. RELATED WORK
To the best of our knowledge, a method to detect route trust level is not known. Therefore, we describe some related work, including PPM, a significant part of the proposed method in this section. Some path detection methods that use traceroute to obtain communication path information are also described.
A. PPM
Savage et al. proposed PPM in 2000 [5] as one of the IP traceback methods. IP traceback is a countermeasure against Denial of Service Attack (DoS Attack) and its goal was to detect the source of the packets sent from the attacker to the victim. Various traceback techniques have been proposed to date. Among the many traceback techniques, PPM is superior in many ways: It does not require a mechanism to monitor the network, generate unnecessary packets, or require extended information beyond the IP version 4 (IPv4) header. Thus, there has been active discussion [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] .
1) Original PPM:
In the original PPM method proposed by Savage et al., the routers along the attack route probabilistically mark their own information onto packets so that the victim can reconstruct the route from the attacker to themselves by collecting the marked packets.
Assuming a router X on the route, X retains 64 bits of data that comprise a bit interleaving of the 32-bit IP address and its 32-bit hash value. The 64-bit data is divided into eight fragments. When X marks the packets with static probability p, it marks 16 bits of information in the IPv4 Identification field. That information consists of three parts: a fragment (8 bits) randomly chosen from one of the eight fragments, the offset of that fragment (3 bits), and the distance metric from the marked router (5 bits).
The characteristics of this method not only include marking of single router information, but also making exclusive OR (XOR) with the next-hop router information. If the downstream router Y does not mark a packet (this occurs with probability 1 − p) and the distance metric on the packet is 0, then Y overwrites the information with the XOR of its own information and the information already written on the packet. Regardless of the distance metric value, Y also increments the distance on the packets. Savage et al. called this "Edge Sampling." Fig. 1 shows the XOR process [6] . This method has some differences to the original: it does not divide the hash value, it uses a flexible data or hash size, and it does not include the distance value in the marking information. Hence, this method is a more general framework for PPM.
In this method, the XOR operation is not performed. Hence, this method is not for reconstructing attack routes, but for quickly finding the routers next to the attacker. Moreover, it is claimed that this method can carry large amounts of data by dividing the marking process into two steps.
B. Route Detection Methods

1) Traceroute:
Traceroute is a widely known tool to detect packet routes [12] . In this method, the source host sends the destination host UDP or ICMP packets with the time to live (TTL) value incremented each time. Routers that receive these packets return a ICMP Time Exceeded Error packet back to the source host. There is also a method called tcptraceroute that uses TCP [13] .
Although traceroute is widely used, there are many routers that do not reply to traceroute requests [16] . As a reason, this is because generating ICMP reply packets could increase the load of the router. In addition, an organization might wish to conceal the IP address of routers for security. Regarding the first point, Govindan and Paxson measured router ICMP generation delays and revealed that there are fewer delays than expected [17] . However, they also reported that their measurement needs scrutiny and improvement. Hence, we cannot ignore the possibility that some routers are unwilling to send ICMP Time Exceeded Errors because of the increased load.
To investigate this possibility, we measured the traceroute reply rate. For this measurement, we executed traceroute or tcptraceroute from a university laboratory (Univ. of Tsukuba in Japan) to Alexa's list of the top 1000 domains [19] . We were able to reach only 386 domains. Furthermore, even when we reached the destination, we did not get a response from 34.4% of the hops. On the other hand, when we used port 80 and tcptraceroute, 986 domains replied to our probe and 40.1% of the hops could not be seen.
Moreover, we express other defects of traceroute. First, traceroute cannot detect reverse path information. Different forward and reverse paths are very common on the Internet. Hence, there is a large demand for determining the reverse path (e.g., in network operation), but it is not possible for traceroute to meet this demand. Second, Marchetta et al. pointed out the imprecision of traceroute's output [18] . Because of overestimation the load balancers and misunderstanding the path changes, traceroute can show users wrong paths in some case.
2) Reverse Traceroute: To address the fact that traceroute can only provide an outbound route, Katz-Bassett et al. proposed a method called "reverse traceroute" in 2010 [15] . They spread several vantage points on the Internet that enabled users to detect the route from a destination host to a source host using the Record Route option on IPv4.
If we want to determine the route from destination host D to source host S, the vantage points send D ping packets whose Record Route option is active and source IP is disguised as S. Next, D sends a reply packet according to the spoofed source IP, and packets carry the D − S router information as a Record Route. Hence, this method reveals the inbound route.
The authors implemented this method on the Internet. However, it required approximately 41 s (median) to complete, hence, they reported that further improvement in the method is needed.
3) Secure Traceroute: Padmanabhan et al. proposed secure traceroute to protect against the threat that malicious routers could take illegal action against traceroute packets [14] . In this method, a shared key is used to encrypt a signature between two routers. As a result, limited routers can distinguish whether or not the packet is from traceroute.
The disadvantages of this method are increased key processing tasks and additional memory consumption of the router caused by increased router pairs. Because the method has not been implemented, the performance of the system has not been evaluated.
III. REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERMINING OF ROUTE TRUST BETWEEN END ENTITIES
There are several requirements for a method that determines the route trust between end entities. In this section, we list the important requirements for identifying route trust.
A. Trust Judgment by End Entities
It is important not to trust routers or networks that say they are trustworthy if we cannot see what routers and/or networks are related to the communication session. End entities such as clients and servers must gather this information for themselves, and then judge its reliability.
B. Active Adversary Model
The semi-honest adversary or curious-but-honest adversary sees the communication data between a client and server but works correctly, and is often considered for such reasons for implementing novel functions on network equipment. However, we assume an active adversary model that can rewrite or overwrite any communication data between a client and server. Because the underlying problem is that we cannot accept a semi-honest adversary model.
C. Low Impact on Router Performance
We could add a function rich enough to avoid all threat if there were infinite resources available on Internet routers and networks. Low impact on router performance is required for deployability if the method is to be applied on intermediate routers.
D. Providing Trust Information from Partial Information
Even though academic studies often assume all entities are ready for novel technologies, deploying the method on all entities is extremely difficult and its deployment and migration status is unmanaged. Hence, providing trust information even when only some entities deploy the novel technology is required.
E. Protection Against Revealing Router Information to Other Entities
Revealing intermediate router information to all entities such as in the existing PPM scheme is not desirable. Malicious users or routers can use this information for other purposes. Information regarding intermediate routers must be provided only to legitimate and trusted users.
IV. PROPOSAL: METRO
In this section, we explain the outline of our proposed method, its system requirements, and prior inspection. We call our method METRO (Measurement of End-To-end ROute trust), and use it in remaining sections.
Figure 2. Outline of Proposed System
A. Outline of Proposed Method Fig. 2 shows an outline of the proposed method and indicates the flow that a client uses to identify the trust level of a route to a server. The black routers in the figure indicate routers that have implemented the proposed method, while the gray ones have not.
(1) Each black METRO-applied router marks the data (that has been divided and stored in the routers in advance) on the packets sent from the server (2) The client gathers the marked packets, checks the distance data (described in next subsection), and detects the number and approximate location of gray routers on the route. (3) The client reconstructs the router information from the marked data, then it obtains route and reliability information about the router. (4) The client inquires about the trust level using various knowledge bases such as reliability, Internet router topology, or country databases using the reconstructed reliability information. (5) Each knowledge base replies to the query. (6) From the replies, the client estimates candidates for the gray routers. (7) Synthesizing the total information that the client has obtained so far determines the trust level of the route.
B. System Specifications
In our method METRO, each applied routers must write some information to specific packets according to PPM scheme. Marking methods and the identification of communication are discussed in this section.
1) Marking Data and Method:
The marking data and area is set as shown in Fig. 3 , expanding the method proposed by Savage et al. [5] . A 128-bit data field is generated, comprising a bit interleaving of 80 bits of data (composed of a 32-bit IP address, 32-bit AS number, and 16-bit index of a reliability knowledge base) with a 48-bit hash value of Figure 3 . Marking Data and Marking Area Five-bit data (initTTL) is used in this method. In the method by Savage et al., the XOR operation reconstructs the contiguity between two PPM routers. However, if there is a non-PPM router between them, the victim cannot detect the non-PPM router. Assuming a realistic network environment of a mixture of PPM and non-PPM routers, detecting the number and approximate position of non-PPM routers is required for an accurate reliability evaluation. Thus, by restoring the value of TTL to initTTL when a router marks a packet, the difference between initTTL and TTL at packet arrival enables the client to determine the distance to a non-PPM router. Eventually, the router marks a packet with a 16-bit fragment, 3 bits for the offset of the fragment and 5 bits for the initTTL in the 8-bit Type of Service field and 16-bit Identification field in the IPv4 header.
The marking method follows Goodrich's work [6] . Each router decides whether to make a mark or not based on static probability p and does not XOR the information of two router, as in original PPM.
2) Marking for Specific Communications: Conventional PPM methods, routers mark to every packet passing through itself. If routers do the same as this in our method, it comes to reveal IP addresses of routers carelessly. There is a possibility that attacker take a chance to attack network by using this proposal system. Therefore in our proposal, it is necessary to carry out marking only for communication between a client and a server that can be trusted. We therefore devised a mechanism that uses a public key cryptographic scheme, performs packet authentication in METRO-applied router. Fig. 4 shows the flow with reference. First, a client sends route assurance request to a server (1). The server generates a Start Kick Packet containing the embedded signature of IP addresses of both the server and client with the server's sign key (private key) in its data area and sends it to the client with static trigger bits set in its identification fields (2) . When the METRO router that relays packets on a route detects the trigger bits, then it obtains the server's verify key (public key) from the registry (such as Resource Public Key Infrastructure: RPKI) and uses it to verify the signed packet data (3) . If the pair of IP addresses that have been got from signature data are consistent with the source and destination IP on the packet header (4), then the router stores this IP pair as a marking target IP pair. Next, the server sends the packets for marking to the client (5), and each router marks the packet if its IP pair equals the target IP pair (6) . After the client gathers enough packets to reconstruct the route, it sends the server an End Kick Packet in which an IP pair is signed with the client's sign key (7) . Routers stop to mark this IP pair (8) just as in step (3). When the server receives an End Kick Packet, it stops sending packets for marking (9) .
C. Prior Inspection
In Internet communication, paths are not constant. To balance the load or control bandwidth on the network, many packets that comprise one communication pursue different paths. Hence, we must account for the problem when the trusted path is replaced by another path for actual communication. In order to avoid this problem in our method, it is necessary to assume that a large-scale change in the path does not occur within a few minutes. Hence, we investigated the amount of path change by carrying out fixed-point observations using tcptraceroute.
From the global IP address of our lab, we executed tcptraceroute for 10 domains randomly chosen from the Alexa list of top 1000 domains. The experiment was carried out over two sessions, and we analyzed the result using the number of unique IP and AS paths as well as the "Levenshtein distances" of these IP and AS paths.
The "Number of unique paths" in the results indicates the number of all path between the client and a particular host, excluding overlap paths. The Levenshtein distance refers to the degree of similarity between two character strings and is the minimum number of edits (deletions, substitutions, or insertions) needed to change one character string into the other. In our evaluation, replacing "one character" with "one IP address" or "one AS number," and calculating the Levenshtein distance between the nth and n+1th execution, we compared the degree of path similarity. Table. I shows the results. The number of IP paths is less than eight, hence we conclude that it is possible to reconstruct paths using the PPM method. With respect to the number of AS paths, the second score is twice as big as the first score, however, both of these scores are within a permissible range. In addition, the Levenshtein distance of the IP and AS paths is three and two, respectively, hence we conclude they are small enough for this method. Given these results, we conclude that path changes over a short time will have an insignificant impact on our method.
V. EXPERIMENT AND EVALUATION
A. Implementation of the Proposed Method 1) Outline of Implementation:
In this paper, we implemented the marking and reconstruction procedures of our proposed method. The implemented steps in this study correspond to (1), (2), and (3) in Fig. 2 . Implementation of the remaining procedures are planned as future work in this area.
2) Method of Implementation: In this study, we implemented: (1) a Linux kernel with a marking function, (2) a userland application on the router, and (3) client and server.
First, we developed a Linux kernel that implements METRO. In our implementation, packet marking is carried out in layer 2 because we developed the marking method not as a router function, but as bridge function for simplicity. However, writing information in the IP header and recalculating the checksum of the header are carried out in layer 3, so we will be able to expand our implementation as router function. Instead of embedding the marking probability configuration or various parameters into the kernel, we use sysfs, a virtual file system provided for Linux kernel 2.6 and later, to set such parameters to kernel. Userland settings can not only result in flexible marking probability, but also flexible marking methods.
Second, we implemented a userland application. To make the communication identification mechanism using a key work correctly, the router must be able to decrypt. We implemented decryption by making the Linux kernel cooperate with a Java application running in userland. This application retrieves public keys and authenticates packets by decrypting data. A pair of IP addresses that are successfully authenticated and become a marking target are passed to the kernel Debian 6.0.1 Java Java SE Runtime Environment 1.7.0 through sysfs. The kernel then adds this pair to a list and uses it for detecting marking target IPs. This Java application was implemented in Java SE-1.6 and executed in Java SE-1.7. Third, the client and server program were implemented to execute processes of the proposed method. On the client side, we use Jpcap, a Java library for capturing and sending network packets [20] .
B. Evaluation 1) Throughput :
To verify the impact on the communication speed caused by implementing the proposed method in a kernel, we measured the throughput of the prototype device.
A packet sender (Server), a packet receiver (Client), and the proposed method implemented on a bridge device (Linux Server Machine) were connected in series (Fig. 5) . The proposed method devices were implemented in the environment listed in Table. II. The operating system of the packet sender was Mac OS X, and it was equipped with a 1 Gbps NIC. The operating system of the packet receiver was Linux (Debian 6.0.1), and it was equipped with a 1 Gbps NIC.
The following four configuration were measured for comparison:
• proposal with p = 0.5 (UDP packets) • normal kernel (UDP packets)
• proposal with p = 0.5 (TCP packets) • normal kernel (TCP packets) The label "normal kernel" indicates a kernel without the proposed method that simply relays packets as a bridge. In the kernel with the proposed method, we set the marking probability p to 0.5 and maximized the number of process to check whether or not the received packet was marking the target. Both UDP and TCP were measured using netperf.
The throughput of each of the four configurations was measured for several packet sizes ranging from 46 to 1500 (based on the largest MTU in Ethernet), and was averaged over 10 trials. We then calculated the pps (packets per
,"' Figure 6 . Throughput for Each Parameter There was not a large difference among the results for UDP. This indicates that there is very little impact caused by introducing the proposed method to network devices with respect to simple packet forwarding without connections. As a comparison with the original PPM methods, we mention result of Okada et al [10] which is the first implementation of PPM. There is a difference that Okada's result reaches the maximum throughput (about 900 Mbps) with packet size 400 Bytes. But we conclude that this gap is caused by machine performance because the throughput of normal kernel is different.
According to Okada's work, the level of marking probability has very little influence on throughput or pps. Therefore, in our method, we set the marking probability freely without the need to consider its effect on communication speed.
On the other hand, the kernel with the proposed method was inferior to a normal kernel when the packet size ranged from 100 to 650 Bytes for TCP. We believe the reason for this result is that TCP makes the connection (initiated by a three-way handshake), and this may cause a delay in the devices. However, Okada et al. reported that the distribution of packet sizes in real communication is almost completely divided into two types: very small (about 50 Bytes) and very large (about 1450 Bytes) [10] . According to this observation, our proposal to forward packets could operate at a high speed, similarly to a normal kernel, in a real-world environment.
2) Load of Proposal Method:
We measured the load required to execute the proposed method in a Linux server machine to estimate the overhead of our method. In the proposed method, the router (bridge) must retrieve public keys from the key server. Therefore, we implemented a simple key-offering server. However, there are a limited number of NICs in a Linux server machine, hence the Server (described in Fig. 8 ) plays the role of key server once. The model of the client was a MacBook Air (mid 2011) with a 1 Gbps Apple Thunderbolt Ethernet adapter.
To measure the overhead, we set the marking probability p = 0.5 and executed the proposed method for 10 consecutive times and observed the free memory or CPU use rate using the vmstat command before and after execution. This sequence was averaged over 10 trials.
The results show that the reduction of free memory after execution of the proposed method was about 253.2 KBytes and the CPU use rate was only 2.6%. From these observations, we conclude that the load of the proposed method is negligible for the network device.
3) Running Time: Running time is an important factor when using this type of system. We prepared six identical machines running the proposed method, as described in Fig.  II , and connected these machines in series (Fig. 8) . The client was same as that described in Subsection V-B2 and the server was the same as the one in Subsection V-B1.
We measured running time over the following four procedures: sending the request, receiving the Start Kick Packet, gathering and reconstructing the marked packets, and sending the End Kick Packet. We repeated this 50 times and calculated the averages. And the marking probability was set to p = 0.082, that is claimed as the optimum probability in the Internet topology by Okada et al [9] Table. III lists our results. The average total running time was 2.25 s, fast enough for users not to notice delays. Even in the worst case, the client can obtain path information within 4 s.
VI. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The proposed method achieves a novel function that identifies the route trust level based on information obtained from intermediate routers or ASs. However, it still has limitations in several respects. In this section, the limitations of proposed method are outlined. Future work to address these limitations is then discussed.
A. Attack on the Proposed Method
There is a possibility of attacks when using the proposed method. Active adversary model can be divided into three types according to the kind of attacker; clients, servers and routers. Malicious clients could launch DoS attack using trigger packet to routers, or obtain router's information by using the proposed method illegally. As example of malicious routers' attack, overwriting the marked data on packets or dropping packets generated by our method (socalled Packet Black Holl) could be problem. As for malicious servers, they could confuse honest clients or routers by using wrong signature. This could lead clients to reconstruct incorrect routes.
As a future work, we will discuss about the strict definition of attack model and consider the impact of attacks. Then, we will examine countermeasures against the attacks.
B. Trust revel
In this paper, we didn't denote the definition of trust revel or how to compute it. In addition to our work described in this paper, we will discuss about the trust revel. Using trust policy of users and third party's information (e.g. Internet Routing Registry: IRR or some reputation services), we construct the reliability knowledge base that provides users the trust revel of detected route.
C. Proposed Method for IPv6
In this study, IPv4 has been assumed. However, IPv6 should be also considered.
In the proposed method, the overall scheme does not depend on the IP version. We only need to consider the version of PPM used. Although IPv6 ready, PPM is outside the scope of this paper, there are several other papers that discuss IPv6-ready PPM [21] , [22] . If there is a lightweight PPM implemented on IPv6, it could be applied to the proposed method.
D. Deployability
When we consider a novel method such as adding some functionality to network equipment, deployability is always problem. In the work of Okada et al., a device to apply the PPM function to working routers was proposed [10] . This work could also be applied to the proposed method.
Evolving Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) might also accelerate deployability.
E. Bidirectionality
The proposed method focuses on the route information returning from servers, that is, in a single direction from the server to client. Reverse traceback has a similar purpose to the proposed method. There could be a case where the opposite direction is also important. For such a case, bidirectionality should be considered.
To achieve bidirectionality, essentially deploying another system in the opposite direction is one solution, even though it might cause a flow concentration problem for a server with many clients.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a method to detect the route and identify route trust level between a client and a server was proposed. To achieve identifying trust level, we use PPM, proposed packet authentication, and knowledge bases from trusted third parties. A prototype system of proposed method was developed and evaluated, and the results show its feasibility.
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed method is the first method that identifies route trust level based on information obtained from intermediate routers or ASs.
